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Introductory thoughts concerning the subject of cybersecurity and 
cyber-physical systems
The virtual space – the so-called “cyberspace” –, made up of interconnected computer 
networks, has undergone an unprecedented expansion during the past decade. To an ever 
increasing extent, state and government bodies, companies and individuals require the abil-
ity to integrate the benefits of their online presence into their daily activities. The World 
Wide Web (WWW) has been the predominant technology for the past several decades to 
share electronic content around the world and retrieve it according to specific criteria. The 
enabler of leveraging the technology and making it accessible globally to everyone was 
made possible by the improvement of quality and reliability of the underlying technologies 
(e.g. network building and server technologies, virtual machines).
As the spatial expansion of cyberspace continues and the density of its supporting re-
source systems increases in the technologically advanced regions of the world, maintaining 
the reliability of services and the security of contents turned out to be the greatest challenge 
ever for the traditionally open and innovative digital technology, offering open access for 
everyone. At the same time, the advanced engineering systems of the future that emerged 
in the recent years are a product of a symbiotic approach to process control and informat-
ics, creating a qualitatively new situation in the area of technologies previously described 
only as safety critical. Traditionally, safety critical systems are described as standalone 
engineering systems and applications the operation of which come with inherent risks of 
life threatening accidents and/or serious damages to the economy, the environment or even 
the society if they malfunction. Such systems include vehicle and aircraft control, applica-
tions in the chemical industry and in nuclear power plants, but also banking applications.
Cyber-physical systems are safety critical systems operating in the cyberspace: their 
physical implementation involves (embedded) computers, with a complicated network of 
connections between them, that collect data over various networks, monitor and control 
complex physical processes, manage sensors and actuators. The prevalent applications of 
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cyber-physical systems have a significant impact on our daily lives thanks to the exceptional 
degree of their adoption by the society: they can have a profound influence on our quality 
of life and on the efficiency of the contribution of industry, healthcare, education, and any 
other systems that are part of the private sector, and/or of an economic player to the na-
tional economy; they determine the state of the environment and the general conditions of 
community work. However, if they malfunction or if they deliver corrupted or maliciously 
altered content, these system may also be capable of causing accidents claiming human lives, 
service disruptions in entire regions, damages to properties, and environmental disasters, 
and as such they should be regarded as systems and technologies that have national security 
related implications, belonging to the critical infrastructure, and should be prioritized both 
in the design stage and in operation. For this reason, protecting the critical infrastructure 
has become a primary objective of modern societies. Technological progress comes with a 
number of benefits and opportunities, but it also carries new security risks and social chal-
lenges. Implementation and sustainable operation of cyber-physical systems introduce new 
challenges in terms of protecting the security of the cyberspace.
The number of risk sources or, in other words, the threat increases in proportion to, 
or – according to certain opinions – at a rate significantly exceeding the growth of the size 
of networks, which can be explained by the fact that the root causes of emergencies are 
mostly coded into the technological systems as structural sources of faults and failures. 
Operation in an incorrectly selected architecture carries structural risks. The risk degree 
has a distribution pattern that shows geographically varying densities, and is related to how 
advanced the local technology is. The fluctuations in the density distribution of services are 
characterized by the inherent proclivity of large-scale networks to form hubs as a result of 
their (scale-free) network organization and growth characteristics. Over the conventionally 
fault-tolerant, highly distributed connection systems of the Internet a highly vulnerable 
service delivery system built on centralized distribution/service hubs is formed, which 
increases the interdependence of system elements, and requires a system-level approach to 
the handling of vulnerabilities. 
Reducing the openness of the system cannot be used to increase the security of cyber-
physical systems as the operation of these systems rely on uninterrupted connectivity, which 
is characterized by a pool of redundant and highly distributed resources and cooperative 
task execution. One of the most important questions is how risks can be reduced by imple-
menting security measures to block attempts at disabling or impairing technologies without 
restricting openness and accessibility that are regarded as essential in the context of those 
technologies and the society. 
Preventive and countermeasures can be divided into two major groups. There are 
so-called design-stage considerations and there are operational-stage methods that can be 
applied to the operation of the rolled-out systems. For example, it is a design-stage consid-
eration that the least vulnerable and self-repairing architectures should be created. When 
the architecture of cyber-physical systems with significant operational risks is designed, 
the security analysis, that is part of the design process, will involve maximizing the per-
missible statistical frequency (risk) of malfunction by a probability value proportional to 
the amount of damage caused, requiring that the probability of an unwanted event should 
never exceed this threshold. 
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In order to meet security requirements, the most critical cases may necessitate the use 
of fault tolerant solutions. Fault tolerance is the property of a system that allows it to restore 
its original functionality by recognizing anomalous changes in its operation (resulting from 
malicious interventions, tampering with data, component failures or any other external ef-
fects that have an impact of any kind on the integrity of the system). Fault tolerance, as a 
design property of the system, is an autonomous operational feature based on the detection 
of faults and failures and any other unwanted changes, aiming at restoring normal opera-
tion immediately.
Up until recently security issues of cyber-physical systems providing critical function-
ality were addressed typically in the area of network infrastructure protection and fault-
tolerant control design. Accuracy, integrity, and reliability of data collected and processed 
by the system and their impact on security were given little though in the evaluation of 
risk factors. The status of sensors and actuators and their interaction with the environment 
containing the system were not a key part of investigations. This practice led to security 
solutions that assumed a closed cyberspace where the origin of faults and attacks was 
likely to be found inside the cyberspace (or, as a matter of fact, in the connection between 
computers). This approach is well characterized by the fact that, for example, while crypto-
graphically encoded and authenticated (digitally signed) data traffic between communication 
end-points offers a solution for securing communication between two parties in a way that 
is literally unbreakable within a reasonable period of time and provides efficient defence 
against unauthorized injection of new data content between the two end-points, it is power-
less against the malicious modification of transmitter-side sensor data (or the immediate 
physical environment of the sensor itself). 
Thus, cyberspace should be regarded as an integrated whole containing sensors, actua-
tors, information and network systems; a space with problems that cannot be resolved from 
the inside without taking into account processes in the environment encapsulating it. This 
way of looking at the problem may facilitate the handling of security risks in systems by 
correctly determining their vulnerability directions and treating their security risks as part 
of their environments, following a systems theoretic approach.
As a result, plausibility problems (trusting) that were brought up earlier in regard to 
the malicious tampering of measurement data and the reliability of sensors, should also be 
addressed as part of a new approach. For example, how can someone be sure that data enter-
ing the system provide an authentic representation of reality? Conventional error detection 
mechanisms of sensor systems which are based on testing the statistical independence of 
measurement data, are suitable for pinpointing physically damaged sensors or sensors that 
failed for any other reasons, and isolating data supplied by them. However, these methods 
cannot be applied to stop sophisticated attacks against the sensor space itself. In order to 
achieve this goal, new systems that are capable of verifying the plausibility of data must 
be used. 
Through the application of the advanced methods of data science and machine learning, 
patterns, fingerprints, and regularities indicating normal operation can be extracted from 
the data entering the system, and then they can be used to detect anomalies. These topics 
are discussed in the first part of the study in which the author, András Benczúr, applies 
one of the most advanced methods of data science, the so-called big data, to the problem 
of input plausibility. In doing so, he elaborates the possibilities of the so-called data-driven 
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methodologies (methods using computer-based analysis and modelling of data) in the de-
tection of security risks. Big Data based, typically real-time analytic processes, however, 
can only be implemented efficiently on an elastic IT infrastructure that offers versatility of 
access and support for custom configurations. The distributed method of data access, data 
sharing between the active elements of the system performing the analysis, and coopera-
tive processing lay down the foundations of employing new plausibility checking methods 
based on the diversity of sources, and as a result, creating robust fault-tolerant systems. 
Design methods of this infrastructure (IT cloud) and the issues of implementing the Bid 
Data concept are addressed by Róbert Lovas in the second part of this chapter.
In cyber-physical systems, resolving input plausibility issues is a topic subject to real-
time constraints. In such cases, control tasks should be taken over by efficiently distributed 
management and filtering strategies that are suitable for the architecture of the system. 
Environment perception methods for autonomous vehicles and vehicles systems, such as 
camera vision based methods, LIDAR (laser) based environment perception technologies, 
and complex shape, movement and human detection applications ensuring the accuracy of 
positioning and monitoring community spaces exposed to risks, represent serious scientific 
challenges in terms of compliance with security requirements. Such problems, including 
the capabilities and the applications of leading environment perception methods and a 
presentation of the typical signals and signal processing devices are discussed by Szirányi 
and Havasi in the third part of this chapter.
The automated transport systems of the future will form an emerging new class of 
critical infrastructures that, due to the overarching character of the transport sector within 
the national economy, play a fundamental role in ensuring the security of systems and 
processes affecting the entire society. Special applications of automated transport systems 
can be implemented in the domain of driverless ground and aerial vehicles. An overview of 
the research and development directions of controlling small flying objects that are usually 
not subject to a permit to fly (drones or UAVs) and the security aspects of integrating these 
vehicles into the air traffic control system is provided in the closing part of our chapter, by 
the authors József Bokor and Bálint Vanek.
